Bankruptcy: The Divergent Cases of the City and the County of San Bernardino by Callahan, Richard & Pisano, Mark
The University of San Francisco
USF Scholarship: a digital repository @ Gleeson Library |
Geschke Center
Public and Nonprofit Administration School of Management
2014
Bankruptcy: The Divergent Cases of the City and
the County of San Bernardino
Richard Callahan
University of San Francisco, rfcallahan@usfca.edu
Mark Pisano
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.usfca.edu/pna
Part of the Business Commons, and the Economics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Management at USF Scholarship: a digital repository @ Gleeson Library |
Geschke Center. It has been accepted for inclusion in Public and Nonprofit Administration by an authorized administrator of USF Scholarship: a digital
repository @ Gleeson Library | Geschke Center. For more information, please contact repository@usfca.edu.
Recommended Citation
Callahan, Richard F; Pisano, Mark. Bankruptcy: The Divergent Cases of the City and the County of San Bernardino. Public Finance
and Management. 14.1 (2014): 84-105.
 Public Finance and Management  ISSN 1523-9721 
Volume 14, Number 1, pp. 84-105 
2014 
BANKRUPTCY: THE DIVERGENT CASES OF 
THE CITY AND THE COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO 
 
Richard F. Callahan, University of San Francisco 
and Mark Pisano, University of Southern California 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 The cases are the two separate jurisdictions of the City of San Bernardino and the County 
of San Bernardino, California, U.S.A. The matched pair offers a unique opportunity for a re-
search design that compares a bankrupt city government with a jurisdiction sharing the essen-
tial demographic, economic, and geographical features, though as a county a different level 
of government. The two cases offer insights into bankruptcy as not simply a function of eco-
nomic forces or recent poor policy choices but as a result of a pattern of decision-making, a 
structure of government, and the constraints placed on leadership by structure and electoral 
politics. The analysis of this comparison allows us to unbundle leadership and show that dif-
ferences in strategy, transparency, civic culture, trust and accountability explain the divergent 
outcomes. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Not all state actors are created equal. A set of challenges exists in explain-
ing the actions of public sector leaders who while being confronted with simi-
lar circumstances choose different paths and different strategies. A problem 
that needs to be addressed in public finance research is how to explain the di-
vergent outcomes of similarly situated jurisdiction. The two contemporary 
case studies in this paper provide a unique opportunity to compare two similar 
situated circumstances, with two different set of state actors. 
 
The cases are the two separate jurisdictions of the City of San Bernardino 
and the County of San Bernardino. These jurisdictions were at the epicenter of 
the collapse of the housing market in 2008. The San Bernardino region east of 
the Los Angeles region experienced one of the sharpest downturns in housing 
and employment in the United States. The City Council of San Bernardino ap-
proved filing for bankruptcy in July 2012. The County of San Bernardino 
Board of Supervisors approved a balanced budget in June 2012. The City is 
nested within the County. Both share not only geography, but also the devas-
tating impact of the economic downturn in housing, employment, and tax rev-
enues. Each of these jurisdictions suffered the housing market collapse in the 
immediate time frame, and both had experienced the exodus of industrial em-
ployment over the past two decades. These cases address the need for research 
that deepen the understanding of the social interactions in public finance 
(Slusher, 2011, 177). In addition, the cases advance the research on the use of 
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municipal debt around risk-assessment, regulation, and the practical challeng-
es facing financial managers (Martell and Kravchuk, 2012). 
 
This paper proceeds as follows. In section one, we consider the basic logic 
of the problem, including research on budgets and finance in local govern-
ment, as well as the findings from our research on fiscal sustainability in com-
parable cases in the region. In section two, we consider the cases of the City of 
San Bernardino and that of the County of San Bernardino. In section three, we 
resolve the problem with an explanation of the features that explain the diver-
gent outcomes of the comparison cases and the implications. 
 
2. PART I: THE STATE OF PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
 
The existing research on bankruptcy is limited by the lack of opportunity 
for designing studies across comparable features. There are episodic cases, 
spread across a wide range of geography, spread out over years. Even with the 
significant reduction of tax revenue in the past five years for local govern-
ments in California, currently only five cities are considering, or have already 
filed for bankruptcy. The descriptive cases emphasized poor oversight of in-
vestments, as in the case of Orange County, or collective bargaining contracts 
that are unaffordable for salaries, health, and retirement benefits, as in the case 
of the City of Vallejo, or poor fiscal policy choices to foster economic growth, 
for example in the City of Stockton. 
 
However, in each of the five current cases of bankruptcy in California, the 
differences between the cities are significantly greater than the similarity. To 
know one bankruptcy is to know none of the other bankruptcies. In practical 
terms, a comparison of Orange County and the City of Stockton would start 
with a list of different demographics, economies, population sizes, workforc-
es, economic drivers, political cultures and a range of other factors that di-
verge institutionally, organizationally, and in the community. Additionally, the 
time frame separated by decades suggests another complication in compari-
sons. Similarly, a comparison of the cities of Stockton and Vallejo might best 
be described as alike in unimportant ways. As a well-developed urban, port 
city, in California’s central valley, Stockton is far removed from the de-
mographics and economics driving Vallejo as a suburb in the San Francisco 
Bay area community. 
 
Extending this logic across the nation, the institutional design of counties 
in California is very different than comparable jurisdictions throughout the na-
tion. The difficulty of finding comparable jurisdictions experiencing bank-
ruptcy in one state of the United States, suggest an even greater difficulty in 
finding shared features on crossing state lines. Geography does matter for 
economic drivers, as well as for governance design features. In addition, the 
complexity of pressures include cyclical, structural, and intergovernmental 
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(Chapman, 2008), as well as the “magical thinking” of residents wanting de-
creased taxation coupled with increased services (Korey, 2011). These factors 
suggest additional variance across geography in organizational and institution-
al design. 
 
One of the great strengths of public finance research is the capacity to ag-
gregate data across a range of jurisdictions, developing trend lines across ju-
risdictions, across time (see for example U.S. Government Accountability Of-
fice, 2013). However, in the absence of shared demographics, economic pres-
sures, and institutional design, a large data set design becomes a weakness in 
exploring the shared features of bankruptcy. For example, the descriptions of 
local governments in the aggregate on the use of flexible budgeting does pro-
vide important insights generalized from surveying a local government juris-
dictions (Beckett and Doamekpor, 2011), but does not provide internal in-
sights as to the decision-making processes that lead to sustainable budgets, or 
conversely the decisions that can drive a local government to bankruptcy. 
 
Describing the state of public finance across hundreds of jurisdictions does 
not get at the question of how each jurisdiction, with separately elected and 
appointed officials, arrived at a poor fiscal position. Research on the munici-
pal debt market emphasizes the importance of financial managers balancing 
the trade-off between maintaining a good credit rating while borrowing for 
needed public projects but calls for more research on institutional design in 
protecting the public interest (Martel and Kravchuk, 2012, 674-675). Similar-
ly, research that surveys performance management usage (e.g. Moynihan, 
2008), can describe the motivation for using data or the conditions that make 
performance management data more readily used, but does not typically con-
nect performance management research with fiscal performance in a bank-
ruptcy filing by a city. 
 
An additional limit to the current public finance research is developed by 
Wagner (2007) in a critique of research that emphasizes the state as an actor 
responding to events, as opposed to a model of public finance as driven by a 
complex set of social interactions. Along the lines suggested by Wagner, a re-
cent public finance symposium on flexible budgeting emphasized the need to 
develop better explanations of resiliency in budgeting and the role of demo-
cratic practices in public finance (Sacco, Stalebrink, and Posner, 2011, 90). 
 
The use of two case studies does not provide the basis for building or test-
ing public finance theory. The research in public finance does provide theories 
or frameworks for budget decision-making (for example, the impact of politics 
in Wildavsky, 1961). The design of this paper is not to test existing theory or 
develop a new theory. Rather, the research design intends to take advantage of 
a natural experiment to contrast outcomes that occur in the same time frame 
and geography between San Bernardino County and City and presents an em-
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pirical puzzle that the existing literature does not fully explain. The implica-
tions of this research can be extended into the future to test a theory or frame-
work of bankruptcy or fiscal stress across a wider range of jurisdiction, as is 
appropriate for theory development and testing. 
 
2.1 SOLUTION TO THE PUZZLE 
 
The matched pair research design of comparing a bankrupt city govern-
ment with a jurisdiction sharing all the essential demographic, economic, and 
geographical features, though as a county a different level of government pro-
vides a unique opportunity. The essence of our contribution in this article is 
two fold: one, a research design that allows for a uniquely situated research 
comparison; two, an explanation of bankruptcy that balances the tension be-
tween the role of individuals, in effect leadership explanations, with the im-
pact of organizational and institutional structure. 
 
Our solution emerges from research into the two cases, but also out of our 
research on fiscal sustainability in city and county government for the past 
three years across a wide range of cases in other parts of Southern California 
(Callahan, 2012; Pisano and Callahan, 2012). The findings from these other 
cases provide a road map for a deeper understanding of the comparison of San 
Bernardino City and County. The two cases offer insights into bankruptcy as 
not simply a function of economic forces or recent poor policy choices but as 
a result of a pattern of decision-making, a structure of government, and the 
constraints placed on leadership by structure and electoral politics. 
 
3. PART II: THE CASES 
 
The basic logic of our approach is a comparison of the two case studies 
with considerable shared features, including geography, demographics, econ-
omy, same time frame, and similar residential housing. This provides an op-
portunity to move beyond the episodic study of bankrupt cities or counties. In 
particular, case study research is particularly well suited to get at the how 
question (Yin, 1994), with particular importance in understanding questions of 
governance (Hendrick, Hill, and Lynn, 2004). Moreover, case study research 
has proven particularly successful at explaining questions of arriving at sus-
tainable self-governing solutions in environmental, common pool resource 
challenges (Ostrom, 2010). There is considerable precedence for research on 
municipal, special district, and county bankruptcy, with case studies in New 
York City, Orange County, California, and other jurisdictions. 
 
The case study approach provides analytical leverage to deepen the under-
standing of municipal bankruptcy through researching the complex interac-
tions of leadership, structure, and politics. In this section we develop each case 
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study around similar features: the context: external economic forces, internal 
decision-making, structures, demographics, and revenues and expenditures. 
 
3.1. THE BANKRUPTCY OF THE CITY OF SAN BERNARDINO 
 
With a population of 209,938, The City of San Bernardino, California is 
the 17
th
 largest city in the state and the 99
th
 largest city in the United States, 
according to the 2010 Census. In fiscal year 2012, the city reported revenue 
of $ 115 million with expenses totaling $ 128 million. The city is one of the 
poorest large cities in the nation. It is the county seat of San Bernardino, the 
largest county by land size in the nation. Finally, it is the largest city in the 
United States to declare bankruptcy under Chapter 9. The transition to bank-
ruptcy has been dramatic, with the July, 2012 City Council approval filing a 
marked contrast to the 1978 recognition as an All-America City award by 
the National Civic League, the highest award given for Civic Performance. 
 
3.2. EXTERNAL CONTEXT 
 
Five external forces eroded fiscal sustainability. One, the loss of large 
employers that created a flight of middle class jobs. Two, transition to rental 
occupied housing. Three, construction of an interstate highway that isolated 
pockets of the community and changed the growth patterns. Four, the loss of 
redevelopment authority, coupled with a failure to expand the property tax 
base through annexation. Five, a national economic downturn coupled with 
decreased federal financial capacity to support cities. 
 
The housing crash of 2008 exposed the City of San Bernardino to the 
perfect storm of devastating job losses, retail flight from the commercial 
center, an absentee landlord housing stock, demographics of a lower income 
population, and a state governor and legislature prioritizing state budget def-
icit reduction over local jurisdictions’ budget needs. For three decades it was 
one located in one of the fastest growing counties in population and housing 
in the nation. Though the city offered affordable housing for the construc-
tion workers, starting in the late 1970’s, the city suffered from the region’s 
dramatic job losses. Approximately 10,000 jobs were lost with the closure of 
Kaiser, 12,500 jobs were lost with the closure of Norton Air Force Base and 
over 3,000 jobs lost with the movement of the railroad maintenance facility 
to Topeka. The housing price collapse starting in 2008 of the Great Reces-
sion led to the loss of a large number of residential construction jobs. 
 
According to one estimate, of the 63,000 housing units, 43,000 single 
family and 20,000 apartments in the city, only 18,000 of the housing units 
have their tax bill sent to the property in which the resident lives, the re-
mainder are sent to absentee landlords. Over 70% of the residents in the city 
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are renters. The city had an unemployment rate of 18%, with over 48% of 
the population on public assistance, and a median income of $38,640. 
 
The completion of the federal interstate highway program and regional 
development patterns adversely affected the city in this same period. In the 
late 1960’s the construction the federal interstate highways facilitated devel-
opment of the commercial centers to the west in the cities of Ontario and 
Rancho Cucamonga 15 miles west of San Bernardino. As these areas be-
came the commercial center of the county, pulling the property and retail 
sales taxes from the City of San Bernardino, a once robust commercial and 
entertainment center rapidly declined. The city which once had 12 auto 
malls today has only five. Amplifying the impact of the freeways has been 
the formation of a separate city on the eastern boundaries with higher in-
come unincorporated areas formed into the new City of Highland rather than 
annexing into the City of San Bernardino. 
 
A more recent setback was the elimination by the governor and legisla-
ture of the redevelopment agencies in the state in 2011. Through previous 
California state law, cities and counties could form legally separate redevel-
opment agencies. The new entities were designed to address economic blight 
by stimulating local construction with the goal of expanding the property tax 
base. The increase in property tax collection in the defined geographical area 
would be dedicated to the redevelopment agency for a period of years to the 
redevelopment agency to fund operations and debt service. This loss of re-
development agency authority shifted city redevelopment dedicated property 
taxes to the purpose of state deficit reduction. The loss of redevelopment tax 
increment funding dedicated to redevelopment projects in the city took away 
a major public policy tool for addressing the extensive and overwhelming 
urban blight, leaving the mayor and council without mechanisms to stimu-
late economic redevelopment in the downtown. 
 
3.3. INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 
 
The study of the internal conditions, the governmental structure and 
leadership further explains how this economic storm reverberated through 
the City of San Bernardino, leading to fiscal insolvency. Several features 
distinguish the institutional design of the City of San Bernardino that affect-
ed fiscal sustainability. In this case, three specific aspects of the institutional 
design significantly reduced the capacity of the city leadership to address the 
perfect storm of external events. These three features are nested together, 
with each aspect affecting the other. First, the charter law process; second, 
the use of the Charter to embed salary expenditures into a fix formula; and 
third, the centrality of the Office of the City Attorney to all policy making. 
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First, a distinguishing feature of the City of San Bernardino was that it 
was established as a charter law city in 1906 using the authorities of state 
law that enabled the population of the city to vote through referendum to es-
tablish the processes and structure of the city government. The charter is 
central to understanding the fiscal transformation of the city from a fiscally 
challenged city to a dysfunctional and fiscally unsustainable and bankrupt 
city. 
 
Second, a distinctive feature of electoral politics in the city has been the 
use of the charter to set operational and budgetary policies. For example, the 
charter establishes salaries for police and fire by specifying increases as the 
average of the annual increase in public safety units in ten specific cities in 
the state, all having stronger socio-economic contexts than the City of San 
Bernardino. The net effect has been regular increases that far exceeded the 
fiscal capacity of the city. 
 
Third, the role of the City Attorney has been central to the operations 
and policy making in the city through a provision in the charter that estab-
lished that only the city attorney has the authority to legally interpret the 
charter. The net effect of the charter provisions have given the city attorney 
policy authority over operational and financial issues within the city, creat-
ing conflicts between the office of the mayor and city attorney. Conflicts be-
tween offices within political jurisdictions are not unusual, but the conflicts 
and the climate for resolving these conflicts are so dysfunctional that a past 
mayor requested a restraining order on the city attorney. Additionally, the 
City Attorney’s Office may have had the professional experience in other ju-
risdictions or in a career focused on public finance typically found in an of-
fice of a city manager or in a county chief executive office. 
 
Fourth, the charter limited the powers of the executive functions. Nei-
ther, the Office of the Mayor nor the top appointed administrator had the 
power of the chief executive to pull together varied policy makers or to 
structure the decision making process to resolve the range of stakeholder dif-
ferences that led to the bankruptcy filing. 
 
3.4 DECISION-MAKING 
 
Three features explain the expenditure choices that contributed to the 
fiscal collapse of the city: first, policy choices on salaries and pensions for 
public safety employees; second, a formal weak administrative structure; 
and third, the political drivers for increased expenditures. 
 
First, in addition to the charter policies that regularly increased annual 
salaries at a rate more appropriate for other jurisdictions, the city council de-
cision-making processes typically did not account for the long-term fiscal 
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impact of decision. The most striking decision of the city council with in-
termediate and long-term fiscal consequences was the approval in 2004 for 
public safety personnel of a pension program of 3% at 50 years of age, i.e., 
pensions would be calculated at 3%, rather than a lower percentage, for each 
year of service and retirement could start at 55 years of age. Additionally 
health coverage would be provided between 50 and 65 when Medicare eligi-
bility starts. These policies create a situation in which eventually the city 
will be paying retirees more than active members of the public safety per-
sonnel. In the bankruptcy filing, longtime columnist on state and local gov-
ernment, Dan Walters noted that the state pension system, CalPERS, was 
listed as the “…largest single creditor at more than $140 million and [the 
City of San Bernardino had] stopped making pension fund payments”, with 
the CalPERS legal filing asserting that the “… the city was trying to im-
properly renege on its pension debts” (Walters, 2012). 
 
Second, the long-standing structure had been with a city administrator 
form of government. To introduce increased discipline in financial manage-
ment, the city moved from a city administrator to city manager structure in 
2006. The cost structure of the city coupled with the changing external con-
ditions over time put revenues on a steep downward spiral. Experienced city 
managers were brought in to improve the financial controls and reports to 
the council. The mayor organized policy retreats with experienced facilita-
tors to create an understanding within the council that could address budget 
imbalances. These efforts did provide some momentum to change city poli-
cies but soon gave way to the politics of the city. Additionally, the city’s 
former auditing firm has been changed, highlighting some of the limitations 
of past audits. 
 
Third, the political dynamics drove increased expenditures. The politics 
of the city underlying council actions and charter amendments reduced fiscal 
capacity, eventually leading to the bankruptcy filing of the city. The political 
realities in elections were shaped by the changing external conditions. The 
changes in the economic and financial conditions of the city fundamentally 
reduced the civic capacity. The civic and political infrastructure had been 
the driving forces behind the successful bid to be designated an all-
American City in 1978 eroded by the turn of the century. 
 
The public safety unions for police and fire were well organized and 
funded. One interviewee claimed that less than 10% of the members of a 
135 member uniform fire department live in the city. The labor unions rep-
resentative for police and fire were politically impactful, with support for 
city council candidates translating to favorable outcomes on the council and 
in the community. For example, in the facilitated discussions at a retreat on 
the financial condition of the city, one of the council members suggested 
changes in pension policy. That council member’s re-election was defeated 
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the next year. In an election in his ward, the opponent’s spending was in 
large part provided by the largest collective bargaining units of the city. 
 
Public elections on the charter and council elections followed the same 
pattern. There is not a well-developed civic engagement strategy or process 
that offers moderating and balancing effects of other interests. Likewise an 
effort to reform the city charter led by Jim Morris, an attorney who served as 
an unpaid assistant to the Mayor—his father—was defeated by the elec-
torate. The warnings raised in the reform campaign failed to move the city 
from the road to fiscal insolvency. Along similar lines, the reports of fiscal 
unsustainability by the Mayor and a consulting firm, Management Partners, 
in 2006 (Morris, 2010) did not move the city council to action in the face of 
electoral dynamics. 
 
3.5 THE DYNAMICS OF DECLARING BANKRUPTCY 
 
In 2010, the Mayor and City Manager reported that the city was on a 
path to fiscal insolvency with immediate steps needed or the city could face 
the possibility of bankruptcy. The Mayor wrote a newspaper editorial sec-
tion column (Morris, 2010) warning of the same possibility. The fiscal con-
dition steadily declined until the budget deliberations in spring and summer 
2012. By this time the city had amassed an unfunded liability of $150 mil-
lion dollars to the state retirement system and other creditors. 
 
Also, affecting the 2012 budget deliberations was the immediate impact 
of Governor and legislature eliminating local redevelopment agencies was to 
reduce the operating revenues that supported positions in the city by $6 mil-
lion. The timing of the state’s fiscal problems and the city’s continual slide 
created the proverbial perfect storm that fiscally devastated the city. 
 
The deliberations of the 2012 budget became desperate. Not only was 
the budget projected to run a large deficit, but also the city’s cash reserves 
were depleted with the city unable to borrow from other cash accounts. A 
controversy developed over the legality of shifting funds from one dedicated 
account to another. But this discussion could not ignore the structural defi-
cits that the Wall Street Journal (2012) editorial writers described as pro-
jected “…$45 million annual deficits for the next five years”. 
 
With cash flow an immediate and pressing problem, the Mayor and the 
City Manager in two months reduced the operating deficit by $18 million by 
taking all service to minimum levels, including reductions in police and fire 
services. In one interview, an assessment was shared that further operation 
costs reduction, outside of police and fire, could only be achieved through 
the actual closing of entire functions and departments. The fiscal outlook for 
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the 2012 budget year was a projected $240 million of debt, including $47 
million in pension obligations, with $115 million of projected revenue. 
 
At the Council meeting of July 10, 20121 the City Attorney recommend-
ed to the council that to protect the city they should file for bankruptcy. In a 
situation described by the reporter for the Los Angeles Times (Willow, 2012, 
p. A1), “…so dire that it could not cover payroll through the summer.” The 
local newspaper, displayed on the front page the day after the City Council 
approval of the bankruptcy filing that the City’s budget expenditures had in-
creased from $144 million in fiscal year 2008-09 to $166 million in FY 
2012-13. The dysfunctional structure played itself out in the council meeting 
with the City Attorney quoted as saying, “the Mayor and Council were not 
given accurate documents” (Willow, p. A10). The Mayor disputed the City 
Attorney’s account. The Council voted to initiate bankruptcy. 
 
3.6 AVOIDING BANKRUPTCY: THE COUNTY EXTERNAL CON-
TEXT 
 
The County of San Bernardino is the largest geographic county in the 
United States. The County’s considerable undeveloped landscape, with driv-
ing proximity for commuters working in Los Angeles City and County had in-
vited a housing construction boom. With the downturn of the economy in the 
United States, the housing construction collapsed in 2008, with many new 
homeowners no longer able to afford mortgages because of job loss or other 
factors affecting their personal debt. As a suburb of the Los Angeles region, 
housing construction had accelerated in the up cycle. The dependence on 
housing construction for growth in property tax revenue and sales tax revenue 
that directly supported city and county government, created volatility in the 
revenue supporting local governments. Not only did property tax revenues de-
crease with mortgage industry collapse, but local sales tax revenues also de-
creased with reductions in purchases by construction and other industry work-
forces. The increase in unemployment further strained county government 
with additional demands for health and human services that county govern-
ment provides by law as the final backstop. From a county perspective the in-
creased demand for services occurs typically when county government is also 
experiencing a decline in revenue. 
 
Prior to the 2008 economic collapse, as noted earlier, the loss of jobs in the 
region affected the County government. The job loss over several decades as-
sociated with closures by five large-scale employers, totaled in the range of 
30,000 jobs. The recession led to an estimate that suggested that in the county 
almost half of homes with mortgages owed more on the homes than the homes 
were assessed at or able to sell for after the Great Recession. 
 
 Bankruptcy: divergent cases 
 
94 
In addition to the external economic forces, litigation in the past decade 
connected to public corruption prosecutions affected the County of San Ber-
nardino. County staff and an elected county supervisor were charged with 
corruption, and a $104 million legal judgment was awarded to a developer 
resulting from a land use planning case action by the county. 
 
3.7 INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 
 
The county geographical responsibilities includes cities, such as the City 
of San Bernardino, as well as unincorporated areas where the county govern-
ment directly provided services, as well as received the property taxes and 
other revenues traditionally assigned to cities. The county has a charter law 
structure, which allows the charter to be changed by initiative. As an extension 
of state government, counties in California are uniquely vulnerable to the 
volatility in state financing. In a state significantly dependent on a small per-
centage of residents paying considerable personal income tax and capital gains 
tax the result is acute state revenue sensitivity and reduction in economic 
downturns. In addition, as the cities in counties face economic downturns, ad-
ditional financial pressures for public safety, redevelopment and other services 
can be placed on county government. Also, as the regional government struc-
ture, county governments can be significantly affected by the success or the 
limitations of regional agencies for transportation, air quality, water, economic 
development and other projects needing cross-jurisdictional cooperation. 
 
Serving a population of over 2 million residents, the County of San Ber-
nardino government has the five elected county supervisors, typical of Cali-
fornia counties, each elected by district. As has been described of the adjacent 
Los Angles County, the power of county supervisors has been described as 
that of “five little kings”. The five elected County Supervisors are both the 
elected legislative body responsible for passage of county ordinances and act 
with executive powers in hiring and firing senior administrative staff, along 
with oversight of the county’s departments. Each supervisor set the priorities 
for their district, with little institutional incentives for coordination or priority 
setting across the five districts. Adding to the complexity, a range of special 
districts had been formed for fire protection and other services. There is no 
countywide elected executive, though the Sheriff and District Attorney are 
elected countywide. As a consequence, this governmental structure is seen as 
a unique combination of legislative and executive responsibilities in the same 
elected official. 
 
3.8 DECISION-MAKING 
 
The conditions needed for change by the County Board were created by 
a combination of external and internal features. Externally the pressures 
were the economic conditions, with the accompanying decline in revenues 
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and increased pressures for services, as well as a public perception political 
ineffectiveness due to public corruption trials. Internally, the pressure was 
driven by a growing recognition of inefficiencies in the existing county ad-
ministrative practices. Central to the political change was the selection of a 
former mayor, Gary Ovitt, as the Chairman of the Board of Supervisors. In 
addition, two new county supervisors were elected from their districts. 
These three of the five members of the board formed a constituency support-
ing new approaches to county governance. 
 
The road to sustainable finances for the county started with the previous 
experience of Chairman Ovitt, who had served as Mayor of the City of On-
tario. Ovitt experienced the executive powers exercised in the city manager 
form of government with the appointed executive responsible for getting the 
silos of city government to work together as needed in the county. From that 
experience, Ovitt developed a high regard for city manager, Greg 
Devereaux’s leadership and management skills. As Chairman of the County 
Board of Supervisors, Ovitt successfully made the case for selection of 
Devereaux as new county chief administrative officer. The management ex-
perience of Devereaux that attracted county elected officials was also the 
same set of skills that facilitated his redesign of the CAO office structure in 
his employment contract negotiations. Devereaux negotiated an employment 
contract with the Board for his hiring as the de facto chief executive officer 
of the county government. Devereaux’s contract assigned to his role that au-
thority and responsibility across all the administrative units in the county. In 
addition, Devereaux’s employment contract of five years provided a long 
term time horizon that minimized volatility in decision-making, insulated his 
office’s from decision-making involvement of Board staff members, and as-
signed to his office the central oversight of county departments. 
 
The hiring of a new individual was not as important for the success of 
the County, as was the new structure of that position. The past practice of 
department directors working directly with each of the five board members 
and their staffs was replaced with department directors reporting directly to 
Devereaux. The changes also allowed the Devereaux’s office to improve hir-
ing practices, as well as to consolidate staffing of a variety of commissions, 
regional agencies, and special purpose districts, improving communication 
and coordination across these former silos. The change in reporting created a 
structure that facilitated priority setting across departments and across the 
geography of the county. In particular, the new structure allowed budget pri-
orities to be developed and implemented. The structure allowed cost savings 
to emerge, including the example set by the Board of Supervisors in reduc-
ing their staff from eleven to six, saving nearly one million dollars annually. 
 
When the Board of Supervisors hired Devereaux to start in February 2010, 
the county faced a 10% deficit, totaling $80 million in the general fund. The 
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initial view of the Board of Supervisors was that the budget deficit was caused 
by the loss of revenue attributable to the economy. Initially, the Board of Su-
pervisors did not view the deficit as a product of Board policy choices on ne-
gotiated labor agreements. The consequences of previous Board decisions on 
negotiated labor agreements became more apparent as expenditures continued 
to rise even as revenues stabilized. 
 
Four factors were cited in interviews with county officials that describe the 
causes for the development of the structural budget deficit. First, the full costs 
of policy decisions were not presented for collective bargaining agreements. 
Second, the full costs of capital projects typically were not readily apparent in 
the approval projects. Third, cost shifting occurred as the county agreed to 
provide services to other jurisdictions without charging full overhead costs. 
Fourth, the county finance system was not fully integrated across all of the de-
partments, particularly in terms of overhead and maintenance costs. The net 
effect was a difficulty for the Board of Supervisors to fully appreciate the 
long-term fiscal consequences of budget policy decisions. 
 
In contrast to a case study of Los Angeles County (Pisano and Callahan, 
2012), San Bernardino County officials had not fully developed the fiscal flu-
ency needed for comprehensive budget discussions prior to the Board’s ap-
pointment of Devereaux. Recognizing these shortcomings, Devereaux and the 
Board members developed a strategy to improve fiscal fluency. Initially the 
Chief Administrative Office integrated the finance tracing systems across all 
departments. Added to the reporting requirements were estimates of the full 
allocation of overhead administrative expenses. Department directors were re-
quired to use the new system. In addition, the budget presented to the Board of 
Supervisor included a ten-year forecast of expenditures. 
 
In combination, these steps began a process of realistically assessing the 
County’s fiscal position. The analysis projected on-going deficits in the ab-
sence of restructuring the county operations to reduce costs, re-negotiating 
collective bargaining salary and benefits cost containment, and facilitating an 
upswing in the regional economy. Devereaux consolidated administrative 
support functions including facilities management, real estate, architecture, 
and engineering to form one unit. This consolidation facilitated the transpar-
ency of budgeting for overhead costs charged within the county. Additionally, 
an effort was made for greater uniformity across the county in application of 
human resources and accounting practices. As a result of these initiatives, 
Devereaux had the experience of increasing the capacity for financial analysis, 
a greater shared fiscal fluency across departments, and an organizational cul-
ture of accounting for the full costs of current and future policy and budget 
decisions. 
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A range of impacts occurred across county departments. For example, the 
Parks Department identified operations with high costs, initiating cost saving 
through developing partnerships with local cities to assist in operations. In one 
case, an excessively high utility bill was identified as due to a broken line, 
which when repaired resulted in an annual cost saving of over $700,000. A 
unified fire services budget captured the costs of multiple districts operating 
across the county, identified cost reductions. The changes shifted the alloca-
tion of federal community development block grant funds as split across five 
Supervisorial Districts, to allocation based on highest needs on a countywide 
basis, leading to funding of a needed county wide emergency responders radio 
system. 
 
The ten-year forecast fundamentally affected collective bargaining negoti-
ations across 16 separate negotiations. The forecast showed the costs of con-
tinuing business as usual. Agreement were reached with each unit, resulting in 
different tiers of pension benefits, eliminating the county payment of a 7% 
pension match, and a 50% reduction in salary increases, from 5% annually to 
2.5% annually. 
 
3.9 THE DYNAMICS FOR AVOIDING BANKRUPTCY 
 
Beyond the specifics of the budget decision-making process within the 
county government, Devereaux launched an initiative to connect county de-
partments and decision-making with the 24 cities in the county, as well as oth-
er public and private sector organizations that comprised the civic infrastruc-
ture. Devereaux drew on his experience as City Manager of the City of Ontar-
io, situated in San Bernardino County. Based on that experience, the strategy 
process examined the nexus between strategic planning, land use development 
and developing a business plan for the city. The business plan for city gov-
ernment leveraged resources to advance the strategy. 
 
For the leaders of the County of San Bernardino government, the strategic 
planning process asked two questions central to the vitality of the county. One, 
where do residents and businesses in the county want to be in 20 years? Two, 
how to get to the description of 20 years into the future? The San Bernardino 
Associations of Governments convened meetings of the local governments 
county officials, and civic leaders, in their capacity as the federally designated 
metropolitan planning agency for the region. Devereaux emphasized the inclu-
sion of contributions from each of the participating entities. The credibility of 
the process derived from the commitment of county elected and administrative 
leaders to develop a strategic approach to generating economic and environ-
mental outcomes. Also, the strategy process committed to linking the county 
budget decision-making process with discussions of the long-term allocation 
of financial and environmental resources. As the process included long-term 
forecasting, one participant described the motivation for participation as sur-
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vival. A significant focus of the strategy process included consideration of the 
land use planning, with review of the general plans of unincorporated areas. 
Also, the demographics and land use projects were considered. 
 
In discussions on the range of challenging issues and real constraints, eight 
elements emerged, with implementation expectation for achieving the goals 
such as “healthy for children” and “business friendly”. Additional outcomes 
focused on human development. A significant finding was the need to coordi-
nate county and city resources to leverage the assets needed for these out-
comes. A specific example included better coordination between county and 
city operated public parks for functional improvements and financial savings. 
The strategy called for milestones to tie into budget cycles. 
 
An innovative aspect of the strategy discussions evaluated the resources 
needed for long-term economic growth, coupled with land development. In a 
county with deserts, water resources emerged as a constraint on future eco-
nomic growth; an expectation emerged for cooperation among formerly com-
peting water resource agencies. The strategy discussion process legitimized 
the public and private water agencies jointly assessing the potential for coor-
dination in addressing long-term water needs in the county. This cooperation 
can be seen as a breakthrough in connecting environmental and budget sus-
tainability. 
 
4. PART III: ANALYSIS OF THE FINDINGS FOR DECISION-
MAKING IN THE CONTEXT OF SPECIAL INTERESTS 
 
The expert panel in 2012 that reviewed the Haynes Foundation funded 
case studies on local government fiscal stress observed that representative 
governments have a difficult time in periods of economic decline. These two 
case studies, in the same time period, in the same region the choice of two dif-
ferent paths invite a deeper examination of the potential divergence in repre-
sentative government confronting similar circumstances. The key features that 
differentiated the two case studies offer insights into the processes of democ-
racy. The explanations connect the complex interactions of special interest 
politics in the budgeting process, the importance of a civic infrastructure, 
transparency to create capacity for understanding fiscal conditions, and pro-
cesses that facilitate trust and accountability. 
 
The budgets of general fund entities are to support all of the functions 
needed to achieve the mission of the jurisdiction and the wellbeing of all 
members. The role of the public safety bargaining units in the City had an ef-
fect of extracting resources. The charter amendments, supported by public 
safety constituency, altered the salaries and benefits increases of these operat-
ing units in effect depleted the fiscal capacity of the city. Similarly at the 
county level, the public safety constituencies supported a charter amendment 
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that threatened to restrict the capacity of the County Board for actions advanc-
ing sustainability. This proposal was defeated narrowly. 
 
4.1 THE IMPACT OF CIVIC CULTURE  
 
Why and how did the civic culture in a city that just decades ago was rec-
ognized for its civic accomplishments as an All American City allow such a 
tactic to work. The answer most repeated is that people voted with their feet – 
as suggested in the Tiebout formulation of public choice – resulting in leader-
ship capacity moving out of the city. Business leaders moved their businesses. 
Some civic organizations lost their membership. Absentee landlords become 
the majority. The city did not lose population but the new residents were typi-
cally poorer. However, these changes alone do not explain the loss of civic 
culture. 
 
John Gardner, past president of the National Civic League, explains this 
unfortunate loss of civic culture (Gardner, 1996). The key to community 
maintenance is the constant nurturing of all the organizations within the city: 
business, churches, labor, neighborhood associations, and education to support 
not just their interest but also the interests of the whole. The need for institu-
tional arrangement for community maintenance is the most important role that 
organizations can perform. Over time these organizations will wane but that 
leaves a need for others to step up. A question emerges as to why the civic or-
ganizations that remained did not increase involvement to advance the inter-
ests of the city as a whole. This decline in organizational maintenance was 
noted in an urban design studio of the American Institute of Architects that 
looked at the possibility of an urban renaissance. The studio noted the lack of 
institutional capacity and alignment as the major limitation preventing the city 
from addressing physical regeneration as well as budget and capital improve-
ments (American Institute of Architects, 1981, pp. 16-18). 
 
4.2 TRANSPARENCY AS POLITICAL CULTURE 
 
Transparency and involvement created understanding of fiscal and long 
run financial conditions in the County of San Bernardino. The strategic plan-
ning process that the County undertook utilized the convening capacity of the 
San Bernardino Council of Governments. This convening process involved the 
private sector and other interests in the County to create a broad, long-term 
perspective, enabled the referendum process to work. Involving all parties in 
the strategic planning process and discussing the budget’s the long run goals 
facilitated connecting fiscal and environmental sustainability. Financial issues 
were discussed not simply as a financial problem but rather in the context of 
county needs over time and outcomes needed to renew the eroded economic 
base. This connection created real understanding within the leadership of or-
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ganizations within the county. The charter amendment battle occurred in this 
period. 
 
The City of San Bernardino leadership during this period did not develop a 
shared understanding of future needs or the current financial conditions of the 
city. Members of the City Council and the City Attorney continually reiterated 
that they did not have financial information or that information provided was 
incorrect. These comments where made after repeated reports and briefings by 
multiple parties, over a long period of time, that presented evidence that the 
city was in serious financial shape and was in jeopardy of being insolvent. In 
the meeting that the City Council voted to file bankruptcy, the City Attorney 
and members of the City Council repeated these criticisms. 
 
4.3 LEADERSHIP AND TRUST 
 
Both organizations were in financial difficulty and the leadership in both 
undertook valiant efforts to right the ship. The final elements that enabled the 
County to pursue the path it did were the actions that the County Board took 
to establish trust and accountability in executive leadership. The employment 
agreement with the incoming Chief Executive Officer, created clear lines of 
authority for financial information within the county even over the budgets of 
elected public safety department heads. Within the City this was not the case. 
This is best exemplified by policies that were made through charter amend-
ments. Additionally, the charter specifically stated that the sole and exclusive 
interpreter of the charter was the City Attorney. The City Attorney, who 
aligned with public safety constituencies, opposed the efforts by the Mayor to 
carry out the executive actions needed to reduce the fiscal imbalances. 
 
The final authority for both entities still rested with the Board of Supervi-
sors and the City Council, but the clarity of the employment agreement hiring 
the new top administrative position contrasted with the confusion that was 
created in the City Charter. This contrast helps explain the very different out-
comes. The combination of the interaction of the structure—the city charter 
versus the county executive office—and the leadership provides the insights 
on why the two organizations followed different paths. 
 
4.4 DECISION-MAKING DRIVES OUTCOMES 
 
The City and the County were both on a collision course with fiscal de-
fault as the Great Recession unfolded. The net effect of the four factors de-
scribed above shifts the explanation from the external economic environment 
to one that draws on very divergent internal decisions responding to the same 
economic downturn. The decision-making within the jurisdiction, not external 
pressures explain the divergence. 
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The most common perception discussed in research interviews was that 
the charter of the City is the fundamental reason for fiscal problems. The 
structures of both jurisdictions are charter law jurisdictions so the feature of 
local home rule determination as a general principle does not describe the di-
vergent paths. An alternative explanation suggested that the intergovernmental 
responsibilities of the County of San Bernardino provided a broader scope of 
activities with more fiscal options and flexibility. However, the County re-
sponsibility for implementation of highly regulated federal and state programs 
typically reduced fiscal options rather than expanding options. In addition, 
minimal budget matches required for federal and state program potentially fur-
ther limited options for the general fund operations of the County. Conse-
quently, this structural difference between city and county operations does not 
explain the different pathways. 
 
4.5 IMPLICATIONS 
 
The municipal bankruptcy filings in the recent past in California have 
revealed a deep tension between competing interests of the varied creditors. 
The conflicts that have recently emerged in the bankruptcy court in the City 
of Stockton case can be seen as a public precursor to the competing interests 
in the City of San Bernardino. The fundamental conflict is between the insti-
tutional lenders who purchased bonds for redevelopment and other munici-
pal debt arguing that the city has honored the pension obligations and com-
mitment to employees at the expense of repaying their debt. While only an 
observer in court, the California Public Employees Retirement System 
(CalPERS), the largest of its type in the nation, has a significant interest in 
the bankruptcy court requiring a city to meet all pension obligations prior to 
discharging other debt. Aligned with CalPERS are various public sector em-
ployee unions, wanting to preserve the pensions and retirement benefits of 
members. 
 
However, the creditor argument becomes more complex with two signif-
icant factors. Institutional lenders arguing in court that the city, in the case of 
Stockton, California, had not sufficiently reduced current employee salary, 
benefits, and future pension obligations, with the city attorney claiming that 
salary costs have been curtailed to the largest extent possible. Treating fu-
ture and current pensions as inviolable and non-negotiable, shifts funding to 
public employees past and current, reducing available funding for debt obli-
gations. The second significant aspect of bankruptcy is an uncertainty in fu-
ture proceedings. The ambiguity can have significant consequences for cur-
rent budget negotiations, as well as for future borrowings. The bond market 
rewards local government and regional projects for reducing uncertainty 
(Callahan, 2007; Martell and Kravchuk, 2012). 
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What emerges from the research is a lack of clarity in the institutional de-
sign, the rules of the game in the legal and financial community. The work of 
our case studies noted from several sources (GAO 2112; Pisano 2013) that the 
fiscal difficulties that governments at all levels are not due to short-term con-
ditions but will last for decades. The legal and legislative framework that ju-
risdictions operate within create uncertainty and do not encourage fiscal litera-
cy and understanding, particularly in periods of long term economic and fiscal 
stress. In the case of the City of San Bernardino, the lack of alignment among 
the organizations and interest groups used this lack of clarity in the rules of the 
game to further their interests. This is illustrated by the recommendation of the 
City Attorney to file for bankruptcy as a way to protect the interests of the in-
terests of the city. The motion was opposed by the Mayor, but approved by the 
council. This issue is still under review in the legal system, but it is interesting 
to note that the majority of the debt of the city is pension obligations, which 
may cause the city to forgo the use of general funds for current operations to 
finance these obligations. This case may become a test of state law to protect 
pensions over the federal law of resolving the bankruptcy. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
The research on these two cases is limited in generalizability, subject to 
the inherent limits of any sets of case studies. Future research can develop the 
exploratory findings suggested by this research as a basis for a confirmatory 
analysis across a larger data set. Some additional implications include the po-
tential to anticipate the features that destabilize local government finances, the 
practices that advance fiscal sustainability, and the structure, strategies and 
leadership skills that can make a difference. 
 
The unique alignment of overlapping and shared features between the City 
and County of San Bernardino explain bankruptcy as neither a product of una-
voidable economic forces nor simply the result of structure. In this paper we 
show that leadership practices matter. The interaction between structure and 
leadership provide insights on why the two organizations followed different 
paths. The analysis of this comparison allows us to unbundle leadership and 
show that differences in strategy, processes that create transparency, civic cul-
ture and trust and accountability explain the different paths. Leadership prac-
tices can make a difference.  
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